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1. INTRODUCTION  
China’s market reforms have resulted in a substantial improvement in the living 
standards of most of the urban population. However, at the same time they have also 
generated marked increases in income inequality and endemic corruption on a large 
scale. And while many have benefited from the marketization process there are also 
the aggrieved, such as those laid-off as part of China’s state-owned enterprise 
restructuring, who have become increasingly vocal in reminding the state of its 
socialist claim to legitimacy and of promises of egalitarianism made during the 
Maoist past. One famous example is the case of Wang Shanbao, a 55-year-old worker 
retrenched from the state-owned sector, whose protest in 2001 took the form of 
drawing sketches of Chairman Mao on the pavement outside his factory, which drew 
daily crowds until the factory managers gave him back his job (Forney, 2003).  
 
Several studies for capitalist countries exist which suggest that individuals who 
believe that success is the outcome of ‘luck and connections’ rather than hard work 
tend to prefer more leftist policies (Alesina et al., 2001; Alesina & Angeletos, 2005; 
Alesina & La Ferrara, 2005). This is especially true where there is a perception that 
capitalism is corrupt (Di Tella & McCulloch, 2006; Djaonkv et al., 2002). della Porta, 
(2000) and Seligson, (2002) show that perceptions of widespread corruption in Latin 
America undermine belief in the political system and carry important political costs. 
While these studies are for multi-party democracies, this is also true for a single party 
state such as China, whose ‘gradualist approach’ to reform has placed much emphasis 
on economic progress without significant political and social upheaval.   
 
The Hu-Wen notion of an ‘harmonious society’ uses the rhetoric of striving for 
‘economic and social development’ where the benefits of higher growth are balanced 
against the need to reduce income inequality, improve access to education, create jobs 
and provide better social protection for those whom economic reform has made 
worse-off. The rhetoric of a harmonious society is aimed at demonstrating the 
government’s commitment to the construction of a socialist market regime on behalf 
of “the people” (as opposed to a re-emergent capitalist class). In using the rhetoric of 
the harmonious society, the Party-state seeks to reassure “the people” that it is 
responsive to the social problems and injustices that have resulted from inequalities as 
well as corruption that have accompanied China’s rapid economic growth.  
 
In this paper we examine how perceptions of corruption in China influence people’s 
beliefs about access to education, income inequality, social protection and 
unemployment; four socioeconomic problems that constructing a harmonious society 
seeks to address. Foreshadowing our main results, we find that there is a positive 
correlation between concern about corruption and belief that access to education and 
income distribution is inequitable and that social protection and unemployment are 
very serious problems. These results are consistent with the Hu-Wen administration’s 
attempt to construct an ‘harmonious society’ that appeals to the traditional communist 
constituency that were once paramount under Mao, but have become increasingly 
disillusioned by the negative side-effects of China’s market reforms.  
 
II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
Our data are from China Mainland Marketing Research Company, which conducted 
face-to-face interviews with approximately 8,500 individuals in 32 Chinese cities in 
2002. Interviewees were asked a number of questions about attitudes and beliefs 
including some designed to capture anti-market sentiments. These included questions 
on access to education (Education-L), social protection (Social-Protection-L), income 
inequality (Income Inequality-L) and unemployment (Unemployment-L). Following 
the approach in Di Tella et al. (2008), the L-extension indicates that higher values on 
these variables suggest left-wing leanings. For example, Education-L  is a dummy 
variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Please evaluate the degree of 
fairness in receipt of educational opportunities” was “very fair”, “fair”, “neither fair 
nor unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very unfair”. We also have data on 
the respondent’s perception of corruption. In response to the question: Do you 
consider the problem of corruption among officials to be serious? Perception of 
Crime was an ordered variable where 1=“not serious”, 2=“serious”,  3=“quite 
serious” and 4= “very serious”. The appendix has a complete description of data. 
 
The following logit regressions were estimated across the 32 Chinese cities for 2002: 
Beliefs-Lic = αCorruptionic + Personal Controlsic +φc +εic 
 
Here  Beliefs-L refer to Education-L, Social Protection-L, Income Inequality-L or 
Unemployment-L. Corruption refers to perceptions of corruption. The subscripts refer 
to individual i living in city c. Personal controls are a set of variables controlling for  
age, gender, marital status, education, income, occupation and ideology of the 
respondent. φc is a dummy variable denoting whether the individual lives in a coastal 
province where the market reforms are more progressed and εic is the (i.i.d) error term. 
 
III. RESULTS 
Panel A of Table 1 shows how Beliefs-L vary according to perceptions of corruption, 
controlling for personal characteristics (other than ideology) and location of the 
respondent. The corruption variable is positive and significant in each case. The 
results suggest that the more serious an individual perceives corruption to be, the 
more likely it is that he or she will hold left-wing views on access to education, 
income inequality, social protection and unemployment. The marginal effects of 
perceptions of corruption on perceptions of income inequality are larger than on 
seriousness of unemployment which, in turn, is larger than on perceptions of 
seriousness of social protection and inequality in access to education. 
------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 
---------------------- 
Panel B of Table 1 presents a similar set of regressions, but in addition to the control 
variables in Table 1, we also control for ideology of the respondent. The survey does 
not have a question that asks directly about ideology. Thus, we use the mean value of 
responses to a question on perceptions of conflict between five categories of people 
designed to represent capital and labor, where individuals who report higher levels of 
conflict are assumed to be to the left of the ideological spectrum (see appendix for the 
details). The results for the corruption variable in Panel B are similar to Panel A. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We have examined the relationship between perceptions of corruptions and left-wing 
beliefs in urban China. We find a positive correlation between perceptions that 
corruption is a problem and holding left-wing beliefs, which is robust to the inclusion 
of controls for personal characteristics of the respondent including his or her ideology 
and the locale in which he or she lives. That there is a positive correlation between 
corruption and left-wing beliefs in urban China, suggest the potential for resistance to 
further marketization. This has been manifest in the form of widespread protests, 
particularly in the iron-rust belt of Central and North-East China. In this respect, the 
Hu-Wen notion of a harmonious society which places emphasis on reducing income  
inequality, creating more jobs, improving access to education and improving social 
protection, can be seen as a direct appeal to those concerned about corruption and 
redistribution and thus an attempt to ensure political and social stability. 
  
Table 1: Perceptions of corruption on left wing beliefs in urban China 
  Education-L  Social Protection-L  Income Inequality L  Unemployment L 
        
PANEL A 
 








Personal Controls (Excluding Ideology)  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Coastal Dummy  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.026 0.073  0.152  0.145 
Number of Observations  8414  7977  8408  8457 
        
PANEL B 








Personal Controls (Including Ideology)  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Coastal Dummy  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Psuedo R
2  0.044 0.073  0.156  0.146 
Number of Observations  8406  7969  8400  8449 
 
Notes: [1] All variable definitions are in the appendix. [2] Marginal effects are reported. [3] Values of z-statistics are in parenthesis.   
Appendix 
China Mainland Marketing Research Company, which is a spin-off from the Chinese 
State Statistical Bureau, conducted an annual public opinion survey of approximately 
8,500 urban residents across 32 Chinese cities in 2002. The surveys were 
administered through face-to-face interviews with urban residents, aged 18 and above. 
 
Education-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Please 
evaluate the degree of fairness in receipt of educational opportunities” was “very 
fair”, “fair”, “neither fair nor unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very 
unfair”.  
 
Social Protection-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Do 
you consider the problem of providing  social protection and bad management of 
social welfare to be serious?” was “not serious”, “serious” or “quite serious” and 1 
if the answer was “very serious”. 
 
Income Inequality-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: 
“Please evaluate the degree of fairness in the distribution of income” was “very 
fair”, “fair”, “neither fair nor unfair” or “unfair” and 1 if the answer was “very 
unfair”. 
 
Unemployment-L: A dummy variable equal to 0 if the answer to the question: “Do 
you consider the problem of unemployment and being laid-off to be serious?” was 
“not serious”, “serious” or “quite serious” and 1 if the answer was “very serious”. 
 
Perception of Corruption: In response to the question: “Do you consider the problem 
of corruption among officials to be serious?” 1=“not serious”, 2=“serious”, 
3=“quite serious”, 4= “very serious”. 
 
Control Variables: 
Age: Respondent’s age in years. 
 
Gender:  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is male and 0 if the 
respondent is female. 
 
Marital Status: A set of dummy variables corresponding to whether the respondent 
was single, married, divorced and not remarried, divorced and remarried, widowed 
and not remarried or widowed and remarried. 
 
Education:  A set of dummy variables corresponding to the respondent’s highest 
education level: Junior secondary school or below, Senior secondary school, 
Polytechnic school, three year higher degree or above. 
 
Income: Respondent’s monthly household income (in RMB). 
 
Occupation: A set of dummy variables for the respondent’s occupation.  
 
Coastal: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent lives in a coastal province; 
zero otherwise. 
  
Ideology: Mean value of responses to the question “Do you perceive there to be a 
conflict of interest between the following?” The five categories are (a) between the 
poor and the wealthy, (b) between white collar and blue collar workers, (c) between 
labor and capital in private enterprises, (d) between labor and capital in foreign 
funded enterprises, (e) between labor and capital in joint ventures.  Possible answers 
are 1= “no conflict”, 2= “very little conflict”, 3= “little conflict”, 4= “considerable 
conflict” and 5= “serious conflict”. We interpret people who report higher levels of 
conflict to be to the left of the ideological spectrum.  
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